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tent than we ever dreamed in our most abject moods. And we should
feel that it must indeed be a colorless world for them.
RUFUS E. MARSDKN.
MENTAL IMAGERY.1
Dr. Slaughter's method was to ' ascertain as nearly as possible the
exact behavior of the image during a certain interval of time which
after trial was fixed at ten seconds.' Figures drawn on cards were
used as stimuli. The subject was allowed to fix his gaze on the figure
for an indefinite time. At a signal he closed his eyes. Five seconds
later he was told by another signal to watch his imagery carefully and
to remember the behavior of it, and, after ten seconds of such intro-
spection, he recorded his results. For stimuli designed to evoke visual
imagery various figures were used, such as a black square on a white
card, with other geometrical forms, playing cards and printed letters.
From these tests and from reports of blindfolded chess players he
infers that the inner or imagery visual field is contracted, that only a
small portion of what was really seen can be reproduced at any one
moment in visual imagery. For the purpose of arousing motor images
the subject was (supposedly — there is no definite statement) shown
cards with, e. g., a picture of a pendulum or of a circle with a ball
on the edge. He was told to get a motor image of this, /. e., to im-
agine the pendulum swinging and to imagine the ball as rolling around
the circle. It is not clear from the article what he asked his subject
to do, whether to visualize motion or, in some part of his body, to
motilize (so to speak) the specified motion. His subjects here report
an actual eye movement in themselves, but this is not either motor or
motion imagery. Auditory images were called for by the presenta-
tion of a tuning fork, two tuning forks with a beat, slowly dripping
water, quickly dripping water, a waterfall, ticking of a watch and
whistling of wind. The dermal, gustatory and olfactory images
studied were those of plush, clammy hand, hot water, plunge into
cold water, the four tastes, and ammonia and alcohol. He states that
in all the tests with the exception of the card series (that is presumably
the playing cards) drawn figures were used instead of call words (p.
529). It is difficult for the present writer, who considers himself at
least moderately skilled in mentally representing his objective experi-
ences with considerable fidelity to the quality of the original sensa-
tion, to conceive how, e. g., a clammy hand could be drawn on a card
1
' A Preliminary Study of the Behavior of Mental Images,' J. W. Slaughter,
Amer.Jour. Psych., October, 1902, pp. 526-549.
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without the words ' clammy' or ' this hand is clammy' either printed
or called; to say nothing of presenting as an auditory stimulus the
line drawing of a waterfall or of two tuning forks with beats! The
method used for the study of visual images consisted in presenting
something to the actual vision of the subject for purposes of making
test conditions and of having them as simple and definite as possible.
These were then voluntarily recalled as visual images and their beha-
vior described. The auditory images (as we learn from p. 541) were
evoked by call words, but we must object here that if this is the case
the study of his subjects' auditory images is not analogous to that of
their visual images. The parallel to presenting real sights to the eye
is presenting real sounds to the ear; and, in the case of motor and mo-
tion images, is the presentation of real motion, i. e.t putting his sub-
jects in a swing or on a rocking horse or giving them a good shaking
by the shoulders for motion imagery; for motor imagery getting them
to do some unusual thing with their arms or legs; and, for olfactory,
gustatory, and other images, giving them real sensations belonging to
these different sense qualities and asking them on some subsequent
occasion if they have observed any mental resuscitation of the origi-
nals. I say on some subsequent occasion, because the quality of some
of the last-mentioned sensations is, in my own case at least, likely to
remain as an after image or memory image (motor, e. g., the rocking
of a vessel experienced by one sometimes after disembarking, which
has the quality of an after image: objectivity, non-subjective deter-
mination, etc.). If this research had been consistently carried out
even with call words as stimuli, it would, to be strictly consistent, have
thrown out the study of auditory images entirely.
The doubtful value of Dr. Slaughter's experiments is plainly
shown in his discussion of his subjects' auditory introspections, e. g.,
he says that his subject St. ' really has better auditory images than K.
and is strongly motor while K. is strongly visual'; and ' when the
object stands out complete except for the sound, and the whole situa-
tion is arranged so as to point to it, it may seem present as a matter
of course whether it actually appears or not, and may seem as clearly
distinguishable as any of the other qualities. It is similar to the case
of the blind spot in the field of vision.' I think Dr. Slaughter has
been misled here by a false analogy. A sense quality is a definite
complete and always distinguishable mental phenomenon, and a subject
if sufficiently trained in introspection can always say whether he has
it or has it not, or feels doubtful about it. It is beyond the province
of any one else to tell him that he has it not, when he says he has it.
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If therefore the subjects of Dr. Slaughter say they had auditory im-
agery, he can hardly presume to say that they did not. He says he
knows his subject St. had no auditory imagery because St. said he had
the other kinds, /'. e., the presence of visual imagery is sufficient proof
that the other kind did not exist, in spite of the statement of the sub-
ject that it did.
To examine in detail some of the verbal reports of the intro-
spection of the subjects, let us take those concerning auditory im-
agery. After the call word (?) 'tuning fork,' subject St. " Felt ten-
sion in tongue but could not really get sound. Had sort of hum-
ming located in mouth fairly continuous. No visual image of fork.
No kind of outside setting." The only words here that can, by any
twist, be made to describe auditory imagery are the continuous hum-
ming ; but he puts it in his mouth! The only way I can mouth the
conception of humming is by means of motor imagery. True auditory
humming is imaged in terms of pure sound, and as I wrote these words
I mentally heard a boys' glee club humming a part of a song. There
is evidently no clear statement on the part of St. that he has any
auditory imagery at all, and yet St. is the subject who ' really has
much better auditory images than K ' ! Let us follow St. through
several other experiments. In ' Two tuning forks with beats' St.
says, " Visual image of two forks. Oscillation of attention between
forks that really seemed external and humming in the head. Beats
were only rhythm put in by emphasis in humming. Visual image
had no setting, seemed just in front in air. It fluctuated considerably."
There may have been real auditory imagery here. To ' Slowly drip-
ping water' subject St. says, "No visual imagery. Felt distinct
movement in throat." This is real objectified sensation, and not
imagery of any kind. "Rhythm intervals about a second long. Word
' drop' was repeated with the rhythm." No description of auditory
imagery here! When he says ' drop' was repeated, he fails to tell
us how. It might have been auditory; but if so, why did not he say
so? It might have been motor, but he does not say that. For
' Quickly dripping water' he says: " Chief part of whole complex was
movement in throat." To 'Waterfall' he says: "Visual image of
waterfall and water falling over. Movement in throat muscles."
And so on. No claim to have had auditory imagery either of ticking
of watch or of whistling of wind, unless his statement about the wind
that it was ' of whistling around corner of house but no visualization
of house' may be taken as a description of auditory imagery. On
the other hand, subject K., the inferior aurilizer, disclaims throat
DISCUSSION AND REPORTS. 303
muscle sensations and visualizations in several instances and uses
expressions descriptive of real auditory imagery such as 'got sound
image,' ' got sound first,' ' sound image very distinct,' ' auditory fairly
constant,' 'sound image first,' 'strong wheezy whistle,'etc., though
he is constantly describing visual motor and verbal concomitants.
Are these concomitants what Dr. Slaughter means by the ' behavior'
of the auditory image? In that case, if a pure unaccompanied audi-
tory image existed in his subjects, even for a moment, they would
not have any behavior, and so would not come within the scope of his
article. It seems, however, that this study of mental images should
as stated (p. 526) be ' a study of particular images, if not in their
relations, at least in situ,' but in the 31 introspections offered us as
studies of auditory images, there seem to be only 11 real examples.
These, to be sure, are studied in situ, or rather all except a few words
of the reports are a description of the situs and not of the image
itself.
Dr. Slaughter remarks on the auditory part of his study that " we
are dealing with a vastly more complicated set of conditions than in
any of the experiments [visual, motor, motion] previously considered.
Images of a visual character are possessed of a certain degree of inde-
pendence, and the conditions of their maintenance are chiefly, for in-
trospection at least, to be found within themselves. Again, motor
images, when taken in isolation, merely require a partial repetition of
the original movement or impulse to that movement. But apparently
in the case of auditory images, the conditions both of obtaining and
holding them have to be brought in from outside. In other words, the
study of auditory images is chiefly one of association, both of ideas
and sense elements" (p. 543). To these remarks I should like to
object: (1) that an auditory image is a psychical phenomena as simple
and elemental as is the sensation of a real tone produced by a tuning
fork, and (2) that its behavior is not its concomitants. These may or
may not influence its maintenance in consciousness, but can not affect
its character. Again, let me urge that if motor images, ' when taken
in isolation' (where's the behavior gone?), require (for their main-
tenance, supposedly) a partial repetition of the original movement,
then during the time occupied by their partial repetition, the image
being comparatively so faint, can not be detected in the mental com-
plex ; and that it is tautologous to say that otherwise they require, in
order to be maintained, the impulse to that movement, because the
impulse differs from the image itself only in the added element of
volition.
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As to the possibility of subjecting mental images to experimental
conditions in the way Dr. Slaughter attempts, I can not but dissent.
Had the experiments been carried out for senses other than sight in a
manner analogous to that for visual images, he would have had for
instance to present a clammy hand to his subjects, let them hold it for
some time, wait five seconds, think hard for ten more, and then ver
bally report their imagery. The results would have been one of three.
Subjects would have felt clammy hand, /. <?., the imagined touch of
it on their own palms or knuckles, as the case may be; or would not
have felt it, or they would not have known whether they felt it or not.
Any one of these is a direct simple answer, and any psychologist
ought to be available as a subject for such research.
I should like to defend my own method as explained in my mono-
graph, and to say that had it been used by him he would probably
have found some others of the ten types mentioned by me. What I
reported was what I mentally saw, heard, touched, felt, tasted and
smelt in various qualities (all imagined, however). Dr. Slaughter
says of my observations of my own imagery, ' The faultiness of the
method is evident after a direct examination of the images.' I do not
know whether he means by this (1) that an examination of the types
of images I reported shows that my method of observing them was
faulty, that the lack of experimental conditions surrounding the intro-
spections was at fault, or (2) that my method of using these results
was faulty (wherein I would with all humility agree with him). If
it was the first, I can only say that having frequently caught myself
paying close attention to the various imagery concomitant with silent
reading, I allowed the reading to lapse, as it were, and entertained
the fleeting images uninterruptedly, much a6 one reading at a window
might lay aside his book and look out at a passing military proces-
sion. This I would continue for an average of seven and a half min-
utes, writing down any word that came into my head, that seemed to
describe the image then occupying the foreground of my mental con-
tent, and ignoring the other images until they came to the fore. I
wrote down words also that did not describe images but were part of
the imagery. These were classed as verbal imagery (largely auditory).
The records show that, while I made no effort to detain any one
image, the average life of any individual one was 8.86 seconds, or very
near the time (10 seconds) which he found by trial.to be the best.
The real issue is whether the method of trying to think in terms of one
sense or another according to stimuli presented by an experimenter is
better than the method of passively observing the constitution of the
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stream of thought. I grant that the attempt to follow the lead of the
experimentally administered and therefore controllable stimulus is more
scientific in a narrow sense, but I doubt that any results can come from
experiments of this nature, because his subject St.'s failure to get the
desiderated auditory imagery in nearly 50 per cent, of the instances
cited shows only that he did not get it that time and not that he could
not mentally image a sound. It was probably scared away by the
unnatural environment of the experiment. There is no proof of course
that St. is not able to have auditory imagery. In fact he may be, as
Dr. Slaughter says he is, a much better aurilizer than K. Just here,
however, he let K. get ahead of him. It seems anomalous that one
should offer as a contribution to the study of auditory imagery the
statement that in half the cases there was none. And I should like
to protest against this experimental method being substituted for mine
with the unqualified remark that mine is faulty. I certainly collected
specimens of the species of phenomenon I was studying.
On the whole, Dr. Slaughter's paper seems to me to be an example
of not a few that have appeared of late in which the conditions of the
experiment are not clearly described; and in the statement of the re-
sults the language is not clear, and gives the impression that there are
more words than ideas behind them. For instance, in a paragraph on
the direction of images he seems to be talking about visual images only,
and, if so, it would have been better to say so; and the paragraph is
so obscurely worded as to be almost unintelligible. When in the con-
clusion he says that ' the factors which keep visual images in clear
consciousness are their own internal organization combined closely
with motor elements,' what can be intended by the • internal organ-
ization' of a visual image other than the image itself; and this is
equivalent to saying that the factors that keep a visual image clear are
the image and its motor elements; but it is hard to conceive what the
motor elements of a visual element of consciousness may be. When
he says «auditory images appear only in connection with an organized
associative situation,' what do these three words mean but images of
other sense qualities ? And if he means to say that auditory images
appear only in connection with other images, he says what is not by
any means proved; and he helps us not at all, for he does not tell us
the nature of that connection. He can not make this statement as a
conclusion from his experiments, as he has shown that some of his so-
called auditory images were not auditory, but only concomitants, only
an ' organized associative situation' mostly motor. When he says
that «images from other sense departments also require such a situa-
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tion which is in most cases all that appears,' he seems to me to be
guilty of a genuine Irish bull! That there is any doubt of the exist-
ence of images of other sense departments than visual, auditory and
motor, I cannot accept for a moment. When Dr. Slaughter says
that 'the real existence of these images is doubtful,' I understand
him to mean their existence in other minds as well as in those of his
subjects. He intimates as much when he, says that ' our subjects
failed to manifest such an elaborate equipment' (as the tactile, gusta-
tory, olfactory, thermal, pain and organic imagery mentioned in my
monograph), apparently throwing discredit on the truthfulness of my
report of my own images. He says: ' One general question bearing
upon the work' is 'whether the images obtained under introspective
conditions are the same as the normal images of every-day life.' I can
not conceive that the normal images can be studied in any other way
save in ' introspective conditions,' and it is only in moments of volun-
tary or involuntary introspectiveness that we become aware that there
are any ' normal working images' at all. So that there is no question
as to the sameness of the images. The vital question is whether in
subjecting or in trying to subject the flow of images to the control of
scientific experiment we may not be changing the nature of these images.
I believe that we can not change their sense quality. They remain
constant in quality, but the machinery of scientific research may cause
them to be obscured or driven below the threshold.
WILFRID LAY.
NBW YORK CITY.
ON LAUGHTER.1
A friend of mine once spoke of Sully's writings as sane, eminently
sane, but dry. In this ' Essay on Laughter,' however, the reader is
fairly deluged and swamped with lively adjectives and figures of
speech. ' Blithely' tumbles merrily after ' sprightly' on every page,
and ' floods of merriment' chase wildly the ' rillets of joy' of less
significant dimensions. Irrelevances in conversation, we are informed,
are among ' the recognized tributaries of the river of laughter,' and
over all the imp of laughter shrieks his way with uncontrollable joy.
Therefore we may say sane, eminently sane, but not dry.
This beautiful largesse of adjectives has, however, also a woful as"
pect. In the modern world of commerce a business manager would
hardly accept a report spread out over 450 pages, a report which might
easily have been compressed within 100 pages. I see no reason why the
•James Sully, ' An Essay on Laughter, its Forms, its Causes, its Develop-
ment and ite Value,' Longmans, Green & Co., New York, 1902, pp. 441.
